A practical secret-key-distribution protocol using general phase fluctuations is described. A preshared key is assumed and is used only inside a transmitter and a receiver. The probabilistic property of signal-light fluctuations works with the preshared key to produce a difference in bit-error rate between a receiver and an eavesdropper. Using the difference, new secret keys are generated information theoretically although a preshared key is used. The probabilistic property of signal-light fluctuations is essential in this protocol, and classical fluctuations as well as quantum fluctuations are applicable. Because signal states are classical, the system becomes tolerant of loss and amplification.
Introduction
Quantum cryptography, founded by Bennett and Brassard, has been widely studied and has given rise to interest beyond a specialized research area because it provides extremely high security. 1, 2) In addition to the original idea of using a single photon, methods using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen state 3, 4) or continuous quantum variables 5, 6) have been proposed and demonstrated. These methods guarantee secret key distribution between two authenticated participants (Alice and Bob) based on so-called no-cloning theory 7, 8) or the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics. Although quantum cryptography is well established theoretically, its practical use is limited because a quantum state is not tolerant of loss and amplification. Although the idea of a quantum repeater was proposed to circumvent this limitation, its technology is not very easily applied. 9) Quantum cryptography has established a valuable position in the sense that it gives unconditional security, and conventional cryptography gives computational security. However, do we necessarily need unconditional security? Because quantum cryptography is limited in practical use, we need to balance attainable security with practical convenience. In conventional cryptography, a seed key is normally used, and an eavesdropper, hereafter referred to as ''Eve'', cannot decrypt it very easily thanks to its computational complexity. In this case, the most potentially serious problem is that a decryption algorithm may be found at any time. If cryptography did not allow Eve to use a more efficient decryption method than a brute force attack against the seed key, then the cryptography would have the highest security among seed-key systems, and the security level of the cryptography would definitely be evaluated quantitatively. For example, we assume a seed key of 128 bits. When the one-process time for checking a key is 1 ns, the brute force attack requires on average 10 22 years. If we could establish such a cryptographic system that operates in realistic circumstances, it would create a method different from quantum and conventional cryptography. This report describes a method for this aim using the probabilistic property of general phase fluctuations.
Secure communications are possible information theoretically when the mutual information IðX; YÞ between Alice and Bob is greater than the mutual information IðX; ZÞ between Alice and Eve. [10] [11] [12] [13] Very simply, this is achieved when Bob's bit error rate (BER) is less than Eve's. References 10-13 assume that Eve's channel is independent of Bob's and that they have independent fluctuations. Based on this assumption, information-theoretic security is obtained due to the fluctuations on Eve's side. These references principally assume free-space communications. Instead, we consider fiber communications in this report, where only a channel should be assumed, and we do not adopt the assumption in refs. [10] [11] [12] [13] . In this case, how can we produce this difference between Bob and Eve? Quantum-mechanical properties can achieve it, and quantum cryptography enables just that. However, we want to achieve it using general phase fluctuations, which are classical fluctuations as well as quantum fluctuations, from a practical point of view. One candidate to support this idea is using a preshared key. The importance of the preshared key has already been mentioned in ordinary quantum cryptography as a tool for authentication. 14) We aim to use the preshared key more actively. In this sense, Hwang et al. proposed determining a basis by using a preshared key. 15) However, when the preshared key is repeatedly used, a complete single-photon state is required as a carrier. Yuen proposed using a pseudo-random number generator together to determine a basis. 16) In this case, the effectiveness of the quantum fluctuations is required. In these methods, the preshared key itself directly determines a basis; therefore, the quantum nature is required to preserve the advantage of Bob. Instead, this paper describes a new protocol where a preshared key is used only inside a transmitter and a receiver, and a transmission basis is determined randomly. The receiver extracts meaningful signals by means of the preshared key. Here, signal-light fluctuations are essential because if this protocol is deterministically processed, the difference between IðX; YÞ and IðX; ZÞ is simply the information of the preshared key, and a new key is never generated. We can break out of this dilemma to some extent by using the probabilistic property of signal-light fluctuations. When the preshared key is used only to make Bob more advantageous in BER than Eve, information theory, where the difference between IðX; YÞ and IðX; ZÞ produces a secret capacity, is applicable. The important thing is the probabilistic property originating in signal-light fluctuations; therefore, the quantum nature is not necessarily required if the probabilistic property is sufficient.
Although a preshared key is required, the key generation itself is processed information theoretically; therefore, the security level of this method is beyond that of computational complexity, but is less than that of information-theoretic security because a preshared key is used. In other words, this method provides a new category of intermediate security between quantum and conventional cryptography.
Protocol
We assume binary phase coding using two bases. Phase coding involves not only phase-shift keying but also differential-phase-shift keying. Alice and Bob share a series of bases according to a preshared key. The schematic difference in the situation between Bob and Eve is shown in Fig. 1 . Bob, who knows a basis, q-(a) or p-axis (b), detects a binary signal with a low BER. However, Eve, who does not know the basis, sees a four-valued signal, and her BER is relatively high because of overlapped fluctuations. The difference in the BER produces a secret capacity.
Eve is assumed to be able to eavesdrop on all signals that are communicated between Alice and Bob in most advantageous conditions. This means that Eve can eavesdrop on signals just near the transmitter. We consider this Eve's simple eavesdropping only in the following because we treat fluctuations classically. In quantum cryptography, an intercept-resend attack is considered as a basic attack. Because this type of attack changes a quantum signal state, this type of analysis is important in quantum cryptography. However, Eve can eavesdrop on all classical signals without disturbing them. If Eve intercepted and resent classical signals completely as information in phase space, it would be the same as simple eavesdropping. If Eve intercepted and resent classical signals with a four-value decision, Bob's BER would increase because Bob can potentially make a binary decision for the original signals. The increase in BER allows Alice and Bob to guess the existence of Eve by checking Bob's BER; therefore, simple eavesdropping is the most powerful strategy for classical signals. Collective attacks and coherent attacks, which are important attacks in quantum cryptography, 2, 17) also cannot be beyond the simple eavesdropping strategy for classical signals.
The overall rough picture of the secret key generation process is as follows:
1. Alice and Bob share a series of bases determined by a preshared key. 2. Alice sends binary random numbers with random binary bases. 3. Bob detects four-valued signals, judges random bases, and checks them with shared bases.
4. When a random basis coincides with the shared basis, the random-number datum is treated as a signal. When the random basis does not coincide with the shared basis, the random-number datum is treated as a dummy signal. 5. Alice and Bob distill a secret key from raw random-number signals through privacy amplification. 18, 19) This rough picture does not consider bit errors, so it is incomplete. The important point is that Eve sees the random numbers with random bases. However, Bob can extract random-number signals using shared bases held inside a receiver.
A complete protocol is schematically shown in Fig. 2 , and an example of random-number signals is shown in Fig. 3 . A transmitter includes three random-number generators (RNGs), and the transmitter and receiver preshare two seed keys (SKs). The output of ''RNG1'' is used as a raw random-number signal, which is encrypted with ''SK2'', is error-correcting-coded, and is held at ''buffer 1''. The output of ''RNG2'' is used as a dummy signal and is held at ''buffer 2''. ''RNG3'' determines the transmission basis. When the output of RNG3 coincides with the shared basis determined by SK1, a random number held at buffer 1 is transmitted. When the output of RNG3 does not coincide with the shared basis determined by SK1, a random number held at buffer 2 is transmitted. Although SK1 is essential, SK2 is not necessarily essential. The sum of SK1 and SK2 determines the size of the SKs.
At the receiver, two quadratures, i.e., the q-axis component, I q , and the p-axis component, I p , are measured with double homodyne detectors. A binary decision on each basis is directly done through the sign of I q and I p . A four-value decision is done through arctanðI p =I q Þ. Bob first judges a signal basis based on the result of the four-value decision. When the judged basis coincides with the shared basis determined by SK1, then Bob treats the datum as a signal. When the judged basis does not coincide with the shared basis determined by SK1, then Bob treats the datum as a dummy. However, many judgment errors occur because Bob determines a basis from a four-valued signal. This basis-
"3" judgment error means that a dummy bit is treated as a signal or that a correct signal bit is omitted as a dummy. For example, in the basis-judgment error case in Fig. 3 , the sixth bit, which is underlined, is an incorrect extra bit. In this case, the data bits following the basis-judgment-error bit become errors with a probability of 0.5 because of the extra bit. Then, because the bit errors become successive, Bob can identify the region including the basis-judgment-error bit, using a parity check function incorporated in an errorcorrecting code. As a simple example, a parity of successive five bits is inserted in the sixth bit in Fig. 3 , which is written in italics. When a basis-judgment error occurs, the parity bit shifts because of the extra bit, and the following parity bits have a probability of becoming wrong of 0.5. These successive errors teach Bob the region including the basisjudgment error. Although Fig. 3 shows a quite simple errorcorrecting code to demonstrate how a basis-judgment error causes an effect on parity bits, powerful forward errorcorrecting codes should be incorporated in an actual system. 20) Bob now knows the existence of a basis-judgment error and the region that includes the error. Although an errorcorrecting code can correct bit errors on definite bases, it cannot correct a basis-judgment error. Bob must find the exact position of the basis-judgment error exhaustively bitby-bit. Bob omits a bit in the region and checks the parity, or he retrieves a bit that was originally omitted as a dummy and checks the parity. Repeating these omission and retrieval processes for all the bits in the region, Bob finds a raw random-number bit stream that gives a low BER. Through this retrieval process, the basis becomes definite and the signal judgment is reduced to being binary, not four valued. This fact is essential because the principle of obtaining the secret capacity is that Bob makes a binary decision from a binary signal and that Eve makes a binary decision from a four-valued signal. In the basis-retrieval process, Bob does not consume secret capacity. He uses only parity bits that are necessarily incorporated as a basic tool. The retrieval process is done exhaustively.
Through the basis-retrieval process, Bob obtains signals that are judged binary. He decodes the binary signals to error-corrected signals based on the original function of the error-correcting code. Bob furthermore decodes them with SK2. He now obtains raw random-number signals that are the same as the output of RNG1. The secret capacity is estimated from the BERs of Bob and Eve according to the standard information theory, described in the next section. A new secret key is obtained through privacy amplification in the transmitter and the receiver to the full extent of the secret capacity. Finally, secret communications are achieved with one-time-pad cryptography using the new secret key.
This protocol has two important points. The first is that a basis is randomly determined and that the preshared key is held inside the transmitter and the receiver. The transmitted random signals with random bases never reflect the preshared key in the key-generation process. Eve can never obtain meaningful information in this stage. This advantage is achieved in exchange of discarding half of the transmitted data. The second is that the basis becomes definite through the exhaustive basis-retrieval process using parity checking. This process makes Bob more advantageous in BER than Eve. In other words, the probabilistic property of signal-light fluctuations works to the advantage of Bob and not Eve due to the definiteness of the basis. This probabilistic property and privacy amplification generate a new key. If the privacy amplification is sufficient, Eve's information becomes asymptotically zero. Alice and Bob cryptographically communicate with each other using the generated new key through a public channel. In this stage, the preshared key-related information is first opened. If Eve performs, for example, the chosen plane-text attack in this stage, she obtains the information of the generated new key. However, if the privacy amplification is sufficient, Eve cannot correlate the generated key and the information on the random signals that Eve might have obtained in the key-generation process. Eventually, Eve cannot obtain the information on the preshared key. Fig. 1(c) . An arrow shows the coincidence of a shared basis with a random basis. The signal is transmitted only in this case. A parity bit, which is the exclusive OR of the preceding five bits and is written in italics, is inserted in the sixth bit in the series of signals as a simple example. The encryption with ''SK2'' is skipped. Receiver: When the basis judged from a received four-valued signal coincides with the shared basis, the bit is treated as a signal. If no basis-judgment error occurs, random-number signals are recovered. If a basisjudgment error occurs, the recovered random-number signals become completely wrong after the misjudged bit. The sixth bit, which is underlined, is misjudged as an example. 
Secret Capacity
Because Alice and Bob know the preshared key K, the mutual information between them becomes conditional, i.e., IðX; YjKÞ. Bob transforms the four-valued-state signals into real binary signals through the basis-retrieval process using the preshared key and parity checking in the receiver. Because Bob makes binary decisions as a result, the mutual information IðX; YjKÞ can be described by channel capacity C b for the binary signals. When the amount of information C is expended in the basis-retrieval process, the mutual information IðX; YjKÞ is given by
The secret capacity is given by C s ¼ max½IðX; YjKÞ À IðX; ZÞ, and when a binary symmetric channel is assumed, the secret capacity is given by
where hðÁÞ is the binary entropy function, and p f and p b are BERs for four-valued-state and binary signals.
11,12)
A basis-retrieval process using parity checking, described in §2, is done with parity check symbols inherently involved in an error-correcting code. Therefore, the basis-retrieval process does not use special information except for the ordinary parity check symbols for bit correction. For this reason, C should be zero for an appropriately designed error-correcting code. As described in eq. (2), secret capacity C s of eq. (3) is generated using the preshared key K. If the preshared key directly determined bases, the preshared key could only be used once. However, this protocol determines the bases randomly, and the preshared key is used only inside a transmitter and receiver. It is only used to make the mutual information conditional and is not the origin of secret capacity C s . The probabilistic property of signal-light fluctuations generates secret capacity C s . This fact allows for the repeated use of the preshared key.
The BERs for binary and four-valued-state signals are estimated as follows: We assume a signal ''0'' on a q-axis basis. Phase fluctuations are assumed to be sufficiently larger than the quantum fluctuation, so we can treat the measurement classically. When the probability phase distribution of signal ''0'' is given by PðÞ, the BER for binary signals p b is given by In this case, the BER for four-valued-state signals p f is given by
When probability distribution is given by
the BER is concretely estimated as a function of fluctuation . Figure 4 (a) plots p b and p f with respect to . For example, when we set 25 for , we get p b ¼ 6:0 Â 10
À13
and p f ¼ 1:6 Â 10 À4 , leading to a factor of 10 8 between Bob and Eve. The plot of BERs can be translated to the entropy of information, and these are shown in Fig. 4(b) .
gives an offset secret capacity but is nearly the secret capacity because C should be zero. The plot of C s 0 almost overlaps with the plot of hðp f Þ, and it hardly depends on hðp b Þ, as shown in Fig. 4(b) . In this estimation, fluctuations are intentionally introduced once to control BER. We must consider extra noise added in a real channel, where Eve should be assumed to be able to detect signals without the extra noise just near the transmitter. In this case, hðp f Þ, which corresponds to the equivocation of Eve, is not changed, but hðp b Þ, which corresponds to the equivocation of Bob, is increased. However, if the extra noise is no larger than the intentional fluctuations, secret capacity C s is not affected by the extra noise because C s 0 is almost solely determined by hðp f Þ. The extra noise is concretely estimated in §5. The secret capacity monotonically increases as fluctuation increases, and it saturates at ¼ 60 . When we consider only the secret capacity, the optimum fluctuations might be ¼ 60 . However, hard basis-retrieval processing is required in a receiver in this case. In addition, an appropriate BER exists, depending on an applied error-correcting code. Practical optimum fluctuations will be determined by using the tradeoff between these factors.
Discussion
We discuss the meaning of fluctuations. When we treat fluctuations classically, even if a signal state is probabilistically distributed in phase space, the state itself is deterministic according to classical physics. This characterizes the difference between classical and quantum fluctuations because quantum fluctuation remains uncertain until the corresponding observable is measured. However, this protocol uses only the notion that signal states are probabilistically distributed in phase space, and it does not matter when a signal point in phase space becomes definite. The important thing is that errors are intentionally introduced, and they make Bob more advantageous than Eve. Therefore, classical fluctuations are applicable to this protocol. An analogy is found in quantum cryptography, too, where intentional errors increase the performance of quantum cryptography. 17, 22) As repeatedly mentioned, the probabilistic property of phase fluctuations is essential in this protocol because the difference in BER between Bob and Eve produces the secret capacity. Although Bob judges a basis with certainty through the basis-retrieval process, the signal is still a point in phase space according to the phase fluctuations. Bob sees the point as a binary signal, and Eve sees it as a four-valuedstate signal. This is the origin of the secret capacity. Another essential point of this protocol is that the preshared key is used only inside a transmitter and receiver in a new-key generation process. The preshared key is never reflected in transmission signals. However, after privacy amplification, the new secret key is used in cryptographic public communications. If the privacy amplification is not enough, some secret information leaks statistically. Therefore, sufficient privacy amplification is important, and the privacy amplification should be done with as long of a bit length as possible to reduce statistical fluctuations. The problem of statistical fluctuations is common in probabilistic phenomena, including ordinary quantum cryptography. The discussed security is assuredly asymptotic behavior.
This protocol generates new keys information theoretically using fluctuations under the condition of using a preshared key. Although a preshared key is used, the key-generation process itself is information theoretic, and the conditional secret capacity of eq. (3) is obtained. The security should be beyond that of computational complexity due to the probabilistic property of the fluctuations, because computational complexity is a security level, where Bob and Eve are assumed to have completely the same information except for a seed key and no probabilistic properties are included. From this point of view, this protocol belongs to a new category. We must establish the information theory on the new category to describe it thoroughly. That is beyond the scope of this report and is a future subject. According to the concrete consideration in this report, this protocol requires making a new category.
Because the new protocol assumes a preshared key, it might be categorized as ''a key growing protocol''. 14) However, because the new key generation is processed information theoretically under the condition of using a preshared key, we call it ''a key generation protocol'' in this report.
Ideal phase fluctuations are antisqueezing. 23, 24) We may more easily use fluctuations of a laser diode (LD) operated near its threshold, where phase fluctuations are large. Alternatively, we have a selection where fluctuations are superimposed at a phase modulator on an ordinary LD output. The concrete protocol in this report is one achievement, which may be modified through a practical system design.
Applicability to Long-Haul Transmission
Although Eve is not affected by the extra noise added in a real channel due to the assumption, Bob is affected. We estimate an example of the extra noise and discuss its effect on the secret capacity. In this report, classical states are assumed, and they can be amplified. Based on this fact, we consider long-haul transmission because it is a good example of showing the practicality of this protocol, and the extra noise can be estimated. The principal limiting factor in long-haul transmission is amplified spontaneous emission (ASE). The ASE increases phase noise directly, and the amplitude noise of the ASE is transformed to phase noise through the Kerr effect of optical fibers. 25) We roughly estimate two kinds of phase noise. The dispersion of optical fibers is assumed to be properly managed.
We assume an amplifier of gain g. When input signal light is amplified, fluctuations are equally amplified, and ASE noise is added. When the two quadrature fluctuations input are a 1 and a 2 and when the vacuum fluctuation is a 0 , the amplified fluctuations are given based on the input-output relation of an amplifier 26, 27) by
assuming a Gaussian distribution. Here, we added the excess noise factor , which is the population inversion factor. 25, 28, 29) The noise figure NF, which is the ratio of the input signal-to-noise ratio to the output signal-to-noise ratio, of an erbium-doped fiber amplifier (EDFA) is given by NF ¼ 2 when the input average photon number n n per signal and the gain g are sufficiently larger than 1. 28, 29) A phase-fluctuated signal state is crescent-shape distributed in phase space, as shown in Fig. 1 . To estimate the phase fluctuations roughly, we approximate the phase fluctuations using the phase quadrature fluctuations. In this case, the input phase fluctuations are given by a 2 = ffiffi ffi n n p . An amplifier increases signals and fluctuations equally and adds ASE noise. Thus, the phase fluctuations become
We assume that a transmission system consists of N spans of fiber length L, i.e., the total fiber length L total is NL, and that transponder amplifiers have the same gain. A signal with an average photon number of n n 0 is output from a transmitter and is attenuated according to the relation n n ¼ n n 0 e Àx in the fiber transmission. We assume that the output signal state has significantly larger fluctuations than vacuum fluctuation, and we assume that the vacuum fluctuation superimposed through the loss process of fiber transmission is negligible. 27) In this case, the phase quadrature fluctuations a
ÀL=2 and adds ASE with gain g according to eq. (7). Thus, the phase fluctuations is expanded to ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi a
. The loss and amplification processes are repeated N times, and the total phase noise becomes
This is the direct ASE noise effect for phase fluctuations. Next, we estimate phase fluctuations transformed from the amplitude fluctuations. We define n 2 as the nonlinear refractive index of an optical fiber, A eff as the effective mode field area of the optical fiber, 0 as the free-space wavelength, and P 0 as the power of signal light. The nonlinear phase shift per unit length caused by the Kerr effect is ð2n 2 = 0 A eff ÞP 0 k 2 P 0 . The power P 0 is given by hc n n= 0 T using the duration T of a signal state, where h is the Plank constant and c is the speed of light. The power fluctuation P is 2hc ffiffi ffi n n p a 1 = 0 T. The phase fluctuations per unit length caused by the Kerr effect are k 2 P. Again, we assume that the vacuum fluctuation superimposed through the loss process of fiber transmission is negligible, then the amplitude quadrature fluctuations a 
1 Ka
The amplitude fluctuations output from the mth transponder amplifier are given by
The phase fluctuations caused in the mth span are ' ðmÞ ¼ Ka . The total phase fluctuations of N spans are given by
These are the phase fluctuations transformed from the amplitude fluctuations through the Kerr effect. We concretely evaluate two kinds of phase fluctuations using eqs. (9) and (12) . We assume a total fiber length L total of 10,000 km, one span of fiber length L is 80 km, i.e., the number N of amplifiers is 125, the NF of an amplifier is 5 dB ( ¼ 1:58), the output intensity from a transmitter is À4 dBm, the transmission rate is 10 GHz, the duration T is 50 ps, and the fiber loss is 0.2 dB/km, i.e., gain g is 40.
For example, when the original phase fluctuations at the transmitter 0 are 25 , the fluctuations are expanded to N ¼ 26:6 according to eq. (9), considering a 0 ¼ 1 that is consistent with eq. (6). When n 2 and A eff are 2:6 Â 10 À20 m 2 /W 30) and 85 mm 2 , respectively, then k 2 is 1.2 rad/W/km, and K is 7:3 Â 10 À5 rad. We assume that the amplitude fluctuations at the transmitter are those of a coherent state amplified with the gain g that is equal to that of a transponder amplifier. In this case, the total phase fluctuations ' total are 30.9 according to eq. (12) . Because N in eq. (9) is the phase fluctuations themselves and ' total in eq. (12) is the phase fluctuations transformed from amplitude fluctuations, N and ' total are fluctuations of different freedoms. Thus, the total phase fluctuations of the two are given by ð N 2 þ ' total 2 Þ 1=2 , i.e., 40.8 . When phase fluctuations increase from 25 to 41 , Bob's BER increases from 6:0 Â 10 À13 to 1:1 Â 10 À5 , according to Fig. 4(a) . However, because the increased BER is still lower than Eve's BER of 1:6 Â 10 À4 at ¼ 25 , as shown in Fig. 4(b) , the secret capacity is obtained even if phase fluctuations increase from 25 to 41
. This result indicates that this protocol using phase fluctuations is tolerant of extra noise corresponding to a 10,000-km transmission. We showed only a concrete example, but the tolerance against extra noise is generally understandable in Fig. 4(b) .
Applicability of Error-Correcting Codes
This protocol uses an error-correcting code as an important element. The secret capacity of eq. (3) is the so-called Shannon limit except for term C. We must use an appropriate error-correcting code to obtain the secret capacity. Recent progress with error-correcting codes has been remarkable, and the performance of error correction approaches the Shannon limit, e.g., low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes. 31, 32) Figure 5 shows schematic performance curves of error-correcting codes at a code rate. The BER after an error-correcting process depends on the raw BER. We assume using a code that has near Shannon-limit performance. An LDPC code is representative of it. Because existing error-correcting codes do not assume performing the basis-retrieval process, the amount of information C is zero for the existing error-correcting codes. BER p b , which corresponds to that for Bob, must be less than the threshold BER p t n of the near Shannon-limit code to make Bob's error correction, where p b is determined by including extra noise in a transmission channel. BER p f , which corresponds to that for Eve, must be more than the threshold BER p t S for the Shannon limit to obtain secret capacity information theoretically. When these two conditions are satisfied, the secret capacity for this protocol is obtained. Because BERs p b and p f differ by multiple digits, as shown in Fig. 4(a) , these two conditions are easily satisfied if the used errorcorrecting code has a near Shannon limit performance.
In estimating the secret capacity under the condition of using an error-correcting code, we should assume that Eve obtains the information of the Shannon limit determined by BER p f because it gives the maximum amount of information for a given BER. However, Bob cannot obtain the information of the Shannon limit determined by p b . Here, we first focus our attention to a code that has the Shannon-limit performance in Fig. 5 . When the raw BER is less than the threshold BER p t S , then the corrected BER asymptotically approaches zero. This means that the amount of information Bob obtains is constant at a lower BER than at the threshold BER; therefore, the amount of information Bob can obtain is determined by p t S . A similar situation is applicable for a near Shannon-limit code. However, the amount of information is not determined by p t n , but by p t S because the Shannon limit imposes bounds on it when a code rate is given. Therefore, when we estimate the secret capacity under the condition of using an error-correcting code, p b is replaced by p t S in eq. (3). Threshold BERs p t S and p t n are the same order, and we can adjust the difference between p b and p t n , for example, in no more than one digit through a system design. Because p f and p b differ by multiple digits, we can achieve the condition p f ) p t S . In this case, the secret capacity is determined almost solely by Eve's BER, as mentioned in §3. For example, when the phase fluctuations at a transmitter are 25 , the secret capacity is 2:3 Â 10 À3 , according to Fig. 4(b) , which corresponds to a key generation rate of 11.5 MHz for a 10-GHz transmission rate, where we considered discarding half the transmitted random numbers and we set C to zero. The secret capacity is the value for an asymptotic behavior. To avoid statistical leakage to Eve, privacy amplification should be strengthened. In this case, the key generation rate of 11.5 MHz is reduced according to the strength of the privacy amplification.
We assumed phase fluctuations of 25 as an example. If we choose phase fluctuations of 45 , then the secret capacity gives a key generation rate of 800 MHz for a 10-GHz transmission rate, although a hard exhaustive basisretrieval process is required. Therefore, the key generation rate varies widely depending on a system design. In this discussion, we assumed phase fluctuations arbitrarily. However, an appropriate BER exists depending on the applied error-correcting code, although the appropriate BER can be designed to some extent. Optimum fluctuations should be determined by considering these factors, and a key generation rate will be determined according to the optimization.
We mention the possibility of using an ordinary errorcorrecting code that does not have very high performance. We discussed error-correcting codes in two cases, i.e., whether they were near the Shannon limit or not, from a viewpoint of secret capacity. We did not mention the structure of error-correcting codes. However, the structure is important to obtain better performance in this protocol because this protocol needs to perform an exhaustive basisretrieval process, which is not considered in existing error-correcting codes. An error-correcting code should be optimally designed by taking the exhaustive basisretrieval process into account in the future to make this protocol more efficient.
Summary
A practical secret key generation protocol that uses a preshared key and general phase fluctuations was described. New secret keys are generated information theoretically using phase fluctuations under the condition of using the preshared key. The security level of this protocol is less than that of information-theoretic security because a preshared key is used, but it is more than that of computational complexity due to the probabilistic property of the fluctuations. From this point of view, the protocol belongs to a new category. The condition to obtain the secret capacity in this new category is that relations p f > p t S and p t > p b are satisfied, where p t is the threshold BER of a used errorcorrecting code. Even if relation p f > p t S is not satisfied, if relation p f > p t > p b is satisfied, Bob is more advantageous than Eve. However, a formulation for the secret capacity is needed in this case, depending on the used errorcorrecting code. Because this protocol uses signal states classically, the signal light is tolerant of loss and amplification, satisfying the required conditions in realistic communication systems. For example, long-haul transmission of 10,000 km is possible.
